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Abstract. Information about the memory locations accessed by a pro-
gram is, for instance, required for program parallelisation and program
verification. Existing inference techniques for this information provide
only partial solutions for the important class of array-manipulating pro-
grams. In this paper, we present a static analysis that infers the memory
footprint of an array program in terms of permission pre- and postcondi-
tions as used, for example, in separation logic. This formulation allows
our analysis to handle concurrent programs and produces specifications
that can be used by verification tools. Our analysis expresses the permis-
sions required by a loop via maximum expressions over the individual
loop iterations. These maximum expressions are then solved by a novel
maximum elimination algorithm, in the spirit of quantifier elimination.
Our approach is sound and is implemented; an evaluation on existing
benchmarks for memory safety of array programs demonstrates accurate
results, even for programs with complex access patterns and nested loops.
1 Introduction
Information about the memory locations accessed by a program is crucial for
many applications such as static data race detection [45], code optimisation
[26,33,16], program parallelisation [17,5], and program verification [30,23,39,38].
The problem of inferring this information statically has been addressed by a
variety of static analyses, e.g., [9,42]. However, prior works provide only partial
solutions for the important class of array-manipulating programs for at least one
of the following reasons. (1) They approximate the entire array as one single
memory location [4] which leads to imprecise results; (2) they do not produce
specifications, which are useful for several important applications such as human
inspection, test case generation, and especially deductive program verification;
(3) they are limited to sequential programs.
In this paper, we present a novel analysis for array programs that addresses
these shortcomings. Our analysis employs the notion of access permission from
separation logic and similar program logics [40,43]. These logics associate a
permission with each memory location and enforce that a program part accesses
a location only if it holds the associated permission. In this setting, determining
the accessed locations means to infer a sufficient precondition that specifies the
permissions required by a program part.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
4.
04
09
1v
1 
 [c
s.P
L]
  1
1 A
pr
 20
18
Phrasing the problem as one of permission inference allows us to address the
three problems mentioned above. (1) We distinguish different array elements
by tracking the permission for each element separately. (2) Our analysis infers
pre- and postconditions for both methods and loops and emits them in a form
that can be used by verification tools. The inferred specifications can easily be
complemented with permission specifications for non-array data structures and
with functional specifications. (3) We support concurrency in three important
ways. First, our analysis is sound for concurrent program executions because
permissions guarantee that program executions are data race free and reduce
thread interactions to specific points in the program such as forking or joining a
thread, or acquiring or releasing a lock. Second, we develop our analysis for a
programming language with primitives that represent the ownership transfer that
happens at these thread interaction points. These primitives, inhale and exhale
[31,38], express that a thread obtains permissions (for instance, by acquiring a
lock) or loses permissions (for instance, by passing them to another thread along
with a message) and can thereby represent a wide range of thread interactions in
a uniform way [32,44]. Third, our analysis distinguishes read and write access and,
thus, ensures exclusive writes while permitting concurrent read accesses. As is
standard, we employ fractional permissions [6] for this purpose; a full permission
is required to write to a location, but any positive fraction permits read access.
Approach. Our analysis reduces the problem of reasoning about permissions for
array elements to reasoning about numerical values for permission fractions. To
achieve this, we represent permission fractions for all array elements qa[qi] using
a single numerical expression t(qa, qi) parameterised by qa and qi. For instance,
the conditional term (qa=a ∧ qi=j ? 1 : 0) represents full permission (denoted by
1) for array element a[j] and no permission for all other array elements.
Our analysis employs a precise backwards analysis for loop-free code: a
variation on the standard notion of weakest preconditions. We apply this analysis
to loop bodies to obtain a permission precondition for a single loop iteration.
Per array element, the whole loop requires the maximum fraction over all loop
iterations, adjusted by permissions gained and lost during loop execution. Rather
than computing permissions via a fixpoint iteration (for which a precise widening
operator is difficult to design), we express them as a maximum over the variables
changed by the loop execution. We then use inferred numerical invariants on these
variables and a novel maximum elimination algorithm to infer a specification for
the entire loop. Permission postconditions are obtained analogously.
For the method copyEven in Fig. 1, the analysis determines that the permission
amount required by a single loop iteration is (j%2=0?(qa=a ∧ qi=j?rd:0):(qa=a ∧
qi=j ? 1 : 0)). The symbol rd represents a fractional read permission. Using a
suitable integer invariant for the loop counter j, we obtain the loop precondition
maxj|0≤j<len(a) ((j%2=0 ? (qa=a ∧ qi=j ? rd : 0) : (qa=a ∧ qi=j ? 1 : 0))). Our max-
imum elimination algorithm obtains (qa=a ∧ 0≤qi<len(a) ? (qi%2=0 ? rd : 1) : 0).
By ranging over all qa and qi, this can be read as read permission for even indices
and write permission for odd indices within the array a’s bounds.
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method copyEven(a: Int[]) {
var j, v: Int := 0;
while(j < length(a)) {
if (j % 2 == 0) { v := a[j] }
else { a[j] := v };
j := j + 1
}
}
Fig. 1: Program copyEven.
method parCopyEven(a: Int[]) {
var j: Int := 0;
while(j < length(a)/2) {
exhale(a, 2*j, 1/2);
exhale(a, 2*j+1, 1);
j := j + 1
}
}
Fig. 2: Program parCopyEven.
e ::= n | x | n·x | e1 + e2 | e1 − e2 | a[e] | len(a) | (b ? e1 : e2)
b ::= e1op e2 | e%n=0 | e%n6=0 | b1 ∧ b2 | b1 ∨ b2 | ¬b
op ∈ {=, 6=, <,≤, >,≥}
p ::= q | rd | p1 + p2 | p1 − p2 | min(p1, p2) | max(p1, p2) | (b ? p1 : p2)
s ::= skip | x:=e | a1:=a2 | x:=a[e] | a[e1]:=e2 | exhale(a, e, p) | inhale(a, e, p)
| (s1; s2) | if(b) { s1 } else { s2 } | while (b) { s }
Fig. 3: Programming Language. n ranges over integer constants, x over integer
variables, a over array variables, q over non-negative fractional (permission-
typed) constants. e stands for integer expressions, and b for boolean. Permission
expressions p are a separate syntactic category.
Contributions. The contributions of our paper are:
1. A novel permission inference that uses maximum expressions over parame-
terised arithmetic expressions to summarise loops (Sec. 3 and Sec. 4)
2. An algorithm for eliminating maximum (and minimum) expressions over an
unbounded number of cases (Sec. 5)
3. An implementation of our analysis, which will be made available as an artifact
4. An evaluation on benchmark examples from existing papers and competitions,
demonstrating that we obtain sound, precise, and compact specifications,
even for challenging array access patterns and parallel loops (Sec. 6)
5. Proof sketches for the soundness of our permission inference and correctness
of our maximum elimination algorithm (included in the appendix.)
2 Programming Language
We define our inference technique over the programming language in Fig. 3.
Programs operate on integers (expressions e), booleans (expressions b), and one-
dimensional integer arrays (variables a); a generalisation to other forms of arrays
is straightforward and supported by our implementation. Arrays are read and
updated via the statements x:=a[e] and a[e]:=x; array lookups in expressions are
not part of the surface syntax, but are used internally by our analysis. Permission
expressions p evaluate to rational numbers; rd, min, and max are for internal use.
A full-fledged programming language contains many statements that affect the
ownership of memory locations, expressed via permissions [32,44]. For example
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in a concurrent setting, a fork operation may transfer permissions to the new
thread, acquiring a lock obtains permission to access certain memory locations,
and messages may transfer permissions between sender and receiver. Even in
a sequential setting, the concept is useful: in procedure-modular reasoning, a
method call transfers permissions from the caller to the callee, and back when
the callee terminates. Allocation can be represented as obtaining a fresh object
and then obtaining permission to its locations.
For the purpose of our permission inference, we can reduce all of these opera-
tions to two basic statements that directly manipulate the permissions currently
held [31,38]. An inhale(a, e, p) statement adds the amount p of permission for the
array location a[e] to the currently held permissions. Dually, an exhale(a, e, p)
statement requires that this amount of permission is already held, and then
removes it. We assume that for any inhale or exhale statements, the permis-
sion expression p denotes a non-negative fraction. For simplicity, we restrict
inhale and exhale statements to a single array location, but the extension to
unboundedly-many locations from the same array is straightforward [37].
Semantics. The operational semantics of our language is mostly standard, but is
instrumented with additional state to track how much permission is held to each
heap location; a program state therefore consists of a triple of heap H (mapping
pairs of array identifier and integer index to integer values), a permission map
P , mapping such pairs to permission amounts, and an environment σ mapping
variables to values (integers or array identifiers).
The execution of inhale or exhale statements causes modifications to the
permission map, and all array accesses are guarded with checks that at least
some permission is held when reading and that full (1) permission is held when
writing [6]. If these checks (or an exhale statement) fail, the execution terminates
with a permission failure. Permission amounts greater than 1 indicate invalid
states that cannot be reached by a program execution. We model run-time errors
other than permission failures (in particular, out-of-bounds accesses) as stuck
configurations.
3 Permission Inference for Loop-Free Code
Our analysis infers a sufficient permission precondition and a guaranteed permis-
sion postcondition for each method of a program. Both conditions are mappings
from array elements to permission amounts. Executing a statement s in a state
whose permission map P contains at least the permissions required by a sufficient
permission precondition for s is guaranteed to not result in a permission failure.
A guaranteed permission postcondition expresses the permissions that will at
least be held when s terminates (see Sec.A for formal definitions).
In this section, we define inference rules to compute sufficient permission
preconditions for loop-free code. For programs which do not add or remove
permissions via inhale and exhale statements, the same permissions will still
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pre(skip, p) = p pre((s1; s2), p) = pre(s1, pre(s2, p))
pre(x:=e, p) = p[e/x] pre(x:=a[e], p) = max(p[a[e]/x], αa,e(rd))
pre(a[e]:=x, p) = max(p[a′[e′] 7→ (e = e′ ∧ a = a′ ? x : a′[e′])], αa,e(1))
pre(exhale(a, e, p′), p) = p+ αa,e(p′) pre(inhale(a, e, p′), p) = max(0, p− αa,e(p′))
pre(if(b) { s1 } else { s2 }, p) = (b ? pre(s1, p) : pre(s2, p))
∆(skip, p) = p ∆((s1; s2), p) = ∆(s1,∆(s2, p))
∆(x:=e, p) = p[e/x] ∆(x:=a[e], p) = p[a[e]/x]
∆(a[e]:=x, p) = p[a′[e′] 7→ (e = e′ ∧ a = a′ ? x : a′[e′])]
∆(exhale(a, e, p′), p) = p− αa,e(p′) ∆(inhale(a, e, p′), p) = p+ αa,e(p′)
∆(if(b) { s1 } else { s2 }, p) = (b ? ∆(s1, p) : ∆(s2, p))
Fig. 4: The backwards analysis rules for permission preconditions and relative
permission differences. The notation αa,e(p) is a shorthand for (qa=a ∧ qi=e?p:0)
and denotes p permission for the array location a[e]. Moreover, p[a′[e′] 7→ e]
matches all array accesses in p and replaces them with the expression obtained
from e by substituting all occurrences of a′ and e′ with the matched array and
index, respectively. The cases for inhale statements are slightly simplified; the
full rules are given in Fig. 6.
be held after executing the code; however, to infer guaranteed permission post-
conditions in the general case, we also infer the difference in permissions between
the state before and after the execution. We will discuss loops in the next section.
Non-recursive method calls can be handled by applying our analysis bottom-up in
the call graph and using inhale and exhale statements to model the permission
effect of calls. Recursion can be handled similarly to loops, but is omitted here.
We define our permission analysis to track and generate permission expressions
parameterised by two distinguished variables qa and qi; by parameterising our
expressions in this way, we can use a single expression to represent a permission
amount for each pair of qa and qi values.
Preconditions. The permission precondition of a loop-free statement s and
a postcondition permission p (in which qa and qi potentially occur) is denoted
by pre(s, p), and is defined in Fig. 4. Most rules are straightforward adaptations
of a classical weakest-precondition computation. Array lookups require some
permission to the accessed array location; we use the internal expression rd to
denote a non-zero permission amount; a post-processing step can later replace rd
by a concrete rational. Since downstream code may require further permission for
this location, represented by the permission expression p, we take the maximum
of both amounts. Array updates require full permission and need to take aliasing
into account. The case for inhale subtracts the inhaled permission amount from
the permissions required by downstream code; the case for exhale adds the per-
missions to be exhaled. Note that this addition may lead to a required permission
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amount exceeding the full permission. This indicates that the statement is not
feasible, that is, all executions will lead to a permission failure.
To illustrate our pre definition, let s be the body of the loop in the parCopyEven
method in Fig. 2. The precondition pre(s, 0) = (qa=a ∧ qi = 2∗j?1/2:0)+(qa=a ∧
qi=2∗j+1 ? 1 : 0) expresses that a loop iteration requires a half permission for
the even elements of array a and full permission for the odd elements.
Postconditions. The final state of a method execution includes the permissions
held in the method pre-state, adjusted by the permissions that are inhaled or
exhaled during the method execution. To perform this adjustment, we compute
the difference in permissions before and after executing a statement. The relative
permission difference for a loop-free statement s and a permission expression p (in
which qa and qi potentially occur) is denoted by ∆(s, p), and is defined backward,
analogously to pre in Fig. 4. The second parameter p acts as an accumulator; the
difference in permission is represented by evaluating ∆(s, 0).
For a statement s with precondition pre(s, 0), we obtain the postcondition
pre(s, 0)+∆(s, 0). Let s again be the loop body from parCopyEven. Since s contains
exhale statements, we obtain ∆(s, 0) = 0− (qa=a ∧ qi=2∗j ? 1/2 : 0)− (qa=a ∧
qi=2∗j+1 ? 1 : 0). Thus, the postcondition pre(s, 0) + ∆(s, 0) can be simplified to
0. This reflects the fact that all required permissions for a single loop iteration
are lost by the end of its execution.
Since our ∆ operator performs a backward analysis, our permission post-
conditions are expressed in terms of the pre-state of the execution of s. To
obtain classical postconditions, any heap accesses need to refer to the pre-state
heap, which can be achieved in program logics by using old expressions or
logical variables. Formalizing the postcondition inference as a backward analysis
simplifies our treatment of loops and has technical advantages over classical
strongest-postconditions, which introduce existential quantifiers for assignment
statements. A limitation of our approach is that our postconditions cannot capture
situations in which a statement obtains permissions to locations for which no
pre-state expression exists, e.g. allocation of new arrays. Our postconditions are
sound; to make them precise for such cases, our inference needs to be combined
with an additional forward analysis, which we leave as future work.
4 Handling Loops via Maximum Expressions
In this section, we first focus on obtaining a sufficient permission precondition for
the execution of a loop in isolation (independently of the code after it) and then
combine the inference for loops with the one for loop-free code described above.
4.1 Sufficient Permission Preconditions for Loops
A sufficient permission precondition for a loop guarantees the absence of permis-
sion failures for a potentially unbounded number of executions of the loop body.
This concept is different from a loop invariant: we require a precondition for
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all executions of a particular loop, but it need not be inductive. Our technique
obtains such a loop precondition by projecting a permission precondition for a
single loop iteration over all possible initial states for the loop executions.
Exhale-Free Loop Bodies. We consider first the simpler (but common) case of
a loop that does not contain exhale statements, e.g., does not transfer permissions
to a forked thread. The solution for this case is also sound for loop bodies where
each exhale is followed by an inhale for the same array location and at least
the same permission amount, as in the encoding of most method calls.
Consider a sufficient permission precondition p for the body of a loop
while (b) { s }. By definition, p will denote sufficient permissions to execute s
once; the precise locations to which p requires permission depend on the initial
state of the loop iteration. For example, the sufficient permission precondition for
the body of the copyEven method in Fig. 1, (j%2=0?(qa=a ∧ qi=j? rd : 0) : (qa=a ∧
qi=j ? 1 : 0)), requires permissions to different array locations, depending on the
value of j. To obtain a sufficient permission precondition for the entire loop, we
leverage an over-approximating loop invariant I+ from an off-the-shelf numerical
analysis (e.g., [14]) to over-approximate all possible values of the numerical
variables that get assigned in the loop body, here, j. We can then express the
loop precondition using the pointwise maximum maxj|I+∧b (p), over the values
of j that satisfy the condition I+ ∧ b. (The maximum over an empty range is
defined to be 0.) For the copyEven method, given the invariant 0 ≤ j ≤ len(a),
the loop precondition is maxj|0≤j<len(a) (p).
In general, a permission precondition for a loop body may also depend on
array values, e.g., if those values are used in branch conditions. To avoid the
need for an expensive array value analysis, we define both an over- and an
under-approximation of permission expressions, denoted p↑ and p↓ (cf. Sec. A.1),
with the guarantees that p ≤ p↑ and p↓ ≤ p. These approximations abstract away
array-dependent conditions, and have an impact on precision only when array
values are used to determine a location to be accessed. For example, a linear
array search for a particular value accesses the array only up to the (a-priori
unknown) point at which the value is found, but our permission precondition
conservatively requires access to the full array.
Theorem 1. Let while (b) { s } be an exhale-free loop, let x be the integer
variables modified by s, and let I+ be a sound over-approximating numerical
loop invariant (over the integer variables in s). Then maxx|I+∧b (pre(s, 0)↑) is a
sufficient permission precondition for while (b) { s }.
Loops with Exhale Statements. For loops that contain exhale statements,
the approach described above does not always guarantee a sufficient permission
precondition. For example, if a loop gives away full permission to the same
array location in every iteration, our pointwise maximum construction yields a
precondition requiring the full permission once, as opposed to the unsatisfiable
precondition (since the loop is guaranteed to cause a permission failure).
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As explained above, our inference is sound if each exhale statement is followed
by a corresponding inhale, which can often be checked syntactically. In the
following, we present another decidable condition that guarantees soundness and
that can be checked efficiently by an SMT solver. If neither condition holds,
we preserve soundness by inferring an unsatisfiable precondition; we did not
encounter any such examples in our evaluation.
Our soundness condition checks that the maximum of the permissions required
by two loop iterations is not less than the permissions required by executing the
two iterations in sequence. Intuitively, that is the case when neither iteration
removes permissions that are required by the other iteration.
Theorem 2 (Soundness Condition for Loop Preconditions). Given a loop
while (b) { s }, let x be the integer variables modified in s and let v and v′ be
two fresh sets of variables, one for each of x. Then maxx|I+∧b (pre(s, 0)↑) is a
sufficient permission precondition for while (b) { s } if the following implication
is valid in all states:
(I+ ∧ b)[v/x] ∧ (I+ ∧ b)[v′/x] ∧ (∨ v 6= v′) ⇒
max(pre(s, 0)↑[v/x], pre(s, 0)↑[v′/x]) ≥ pre(s, pre(s, 0)↑[v′/x])↑[v/x]
The additional variables v and v′ are used to model two arbitrary valuations of x;
we constrain these to represent two initial states allowed by I+ ∧ b and different
from each other for at least one program variable. We then require that the effect
of analysing each loop iteration independently and taking the maximum is not
smaller than the effect of sequentially composing the two loop iterations.
The theorem requires implicitly that no two different iterations of a loop
observe exactly the same values for all integer variables. If that could be the
case, the condition
∨
v 6= v′ would cause us to ignore a potential pair of initial
states for two different loop iterations. To avoid this problem, we assume that all
loops satisfy this requirement; it can easily be enforced by adding an additional
variable as loop iteration counter [21].
For the parCopyEven method (Fig. 2), the soundness condition holds since,
due to the v 6= v′ condition, the two terms on the right of the implication
are equal for all values of qi. We can thus infer a sufficient precondition as
maxj|0≤j<len(a)/2 ((qa=a ∧ qi = 2∗j ? 1/2 : 0) + (qa=a ∧ qi=2∗j+1 ? 1 : 0)).
4.2 Permission Inference for Loops
We can now extend the pre- and postcondition inference from Sec. 3 with loops.
pre(while (b) { s }, p) must require permissions such that (1) the loop executes
without permission failure and (2) at least the permissions described by p are held
when the loop terminates. While the former is provided by the loop precondition
as defined in the previous subsection, the latter also depends on the permissions
gained or lost during the execution of the loop. To characterise these permissions,
we extend the ∆ operator from Sec. 3 to handle loops.
Under the soundness condition from Thm. 2, we can mimic the approach
from the previous subsection and use over-approximating invariants to project
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out the permissions lost in a single loop iteration (where ∆(s, 0) is negative)
to those lost by the entire loop, using a maximum expression. This projection
conservatively assumes that the permissions lost in a single iteration are lost
by all iterations whose initial state is allowed by the loop invariant and loop
condition. This approach is a sound over-approximation of the permissions lost.
However, for the permissions gained by a loop iteration (where ∆(s, 0) is
positive), this approach would be unsound because the over-approximation
includes iterations that may not actually happen and, thus, permissions that are
not actually gained. For this reason, our technique handles gained permissions via
an under-approximate1 numerical loop invariant I− (e.g., [35]) and thus projects
the gained permissions only over iterations that will surely happen.
This approach is reflected in the definition of our ∆ operator below via
d, which represents the permissions possibly lost or definitely gained over all
iterations of the loop. In the former case, we have ∆(s, 0) < 0 and, thus, the
first summand is 0 and the computation based on the over-approximate invariant
applies (note that the negated maximum of negated values is the minimum; we
take the minimum over negative values). In the latter case (∆(s, 0) > 0), the
second summand is 0 and the computation based on the under-approximate
invariant applies (we take the maximum over positive values).
∆(while (b) { s }, p) = (b ? d+ p′ : p), where:
d = max
x|I−∧b
max(0,∆(s, 0))↓ − max
x|I+∧b
max(0,−∆(s, 0))↑
p′ = max
x|I−∧¬b
max(0, p)↓ − max
x|I+∧¬b
max(0,−p)↑
x denotes again the integer variables modified in s. The role of p′ is to carry over
the permissions p that are gained or lost by the code following the loop, taking
into account any state changes performed by the loop. Intuitively, the maximum
expressions replace the variables x in p with expressions that do not depend
on these variables but nonetheless reflect properties of their values right after
the execution of the loop. For permissions gained, these properties are based on
the under-approximate loop invariant to ensure that they hold for any possible
loop execution. For permissions lost, we use the over-approximate invariant.
For the loop in parCopyEven we use the invariant 0 ≤ j ≤ len(a)/2 to obtain
d = −maxj|0≤j<len(a)/2 ((qa=a ∧ qi = 2∗j ? 1/2 : 0) + (qa=a ∧ qi=2∗j+1 ? 1 : 0)).
Since there are no statements following the loop, p and therefore p′ are 0.
Using the same d term, we can now define the general case of pre for loops,
combining (1) the loop precondition and (2) the permissions required by the code
after the loop, adjusted by the permissions gained or lost during loop execution:
pre(while (b) { s }, p) = (b ? max( max
x|I+∧b
pre(s, 0)↑, max
x|I+∧¬b
(p↑)− d) : p)
Similarly to p′ in the rule for ∆, the expression maxx|I+∧¬b (p↑) conservatively
over-approximates the permissions required to execute the code after the loop.
1 An under-approximate loop invariant must be true only for states that will actually
be encountered when executing the loop.
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For method parCopyEven, we obtain a sufficient precondition that is the negation
of the ∆. Consequently, the postcondition is 0.
Soundness. Our pre and ∆ definitions yield a sound method for computing
sufficient permission preconditions and guaranteed postconditions:
Theorem 3 (Soundness of Permission Inference). For any statement s, if
every while loop in s either is exhale-free or satisfies the condition of Thm. 2
then pre(s, 0) is a sufficient permission precondition for s, and pre(s, 0) + ∆(s, 0)
is a corresponding guaranteed permission postcondition.
Our inference expresses pre and postconditions using a maximum operator
over an unbounded set of values. However, this operator is not supported by SMT
solvers. To be able to use the inferred conditions for SMT-based verification, we
provide an algorithm for eliminating these operators, as we discuss next.
5 A Maximum Elimination Algorithm
We now present a new algorithm for replacing maximum expressions over an
unbounded set of values (called pointwise maximum expressions in the follow-
ing) with equivalent expressions containing no pointwise maximum expressions.
Note that, technically our algorithm computes solutions to maxx|b∧p≥0(p) since
some optimisations exploit the fact that the permission expressions our analysis
generates always denote non-negative values.
5.1 Background: Quantifier Elimination
Our algorithm builds upon ideas from Cooper’s classic quantifier elimination
algorithm [12] which, given a formula ∃x.b (where b is a quantifier-free Presburger
formula), computes an equivalent quantifier-free formula b′. Below, we give a
brief summary of Cooper’s approach.
The problem is first reduced via boolean and arithmetic manipulations to a
formula ∃x.b in which x occurs at most once per literal and with no coefficient.
The key idea is then to reduce ∃x.b to a disjunction of two cases: (1) there is a
smallest value of x making b true, or (2) b is true for arbitrarily small values of x.
In case (1), one computes a finite set of expressions S (the bi in [12]) guaranteed
to include the smallest value of x. For each (in/dis-)equality literal containing x
in b, one collects a boundary expression e which denotes a value for x making
the literal true, while the value e− 1 would make it false. For example, for the
literal y < x one generates the expression y + 1. If there are no (non-)divisibility
constraints in b, by definition, S will include the smallest value of x making b true.
To account for (non-)divisibility constraints such as x%2=0, the lowest-common-
multiple δ of the divisors (and 1) is returned along with S; the guarantee is then
that the smallest value of x making b true will be e + d for some e ∈ S and
d ∈ [0, δ − 1]. We use 〈〈b〉〉small(x) to denote the function handling this computation.
Then, ∃x.b can be reduced to ∨e∈S,d∈[0,δ−1] b[e+ d/x], where (S, δ) = 〈〈b〉〉small(x).
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In case (2), one can observe that the (in/dis-)equality literals in b will flip
value at finitely many values of x, and so for sufficiently small values of x, each
(in/dis-)equality literal in b will have a constant value (e.g., y > x will be true). By
replacing these literals with these constant values, one obtains a new expression b′
equal to b for small enough x, and which depends on x only via (non-)divisibility
constraints. The value of b′ will therefore actually be determined by x mod δ,
where δ is the lowest-common-multiple of the (non-)divisibility constraints. We
use 〈〈b〉〉−∞(x) to denote the function handling this computation. Then, ∃x.b can
be reduced to
∨
d∈[0,δ−1] b
′[d/x], where (b′, δ) = 〈〈b〉〉−∞(x).
In principle, the maximum of a function y = maxx f(x) can be defined using
two first-order quantifiers ∀x.f(x) ≤ y and ∃x.f(x) = y. One might therefore be
tempted to tackle our maximum elimination problem using quantifier elimination
directly. We explored this possibility and found two serious drawbacks. First, the
resulting formula does not yield a permission-typed expression that we can plug
back into our analysis. Second, the resulting formulas are extremely large (e.g.,
for the copyEven example it yields several pages of specifications), and hard to
simplify since relevant information is often spread across many terms due to the
two separate quantifiers. Our maximum elimination algorithm addresses these
drawbacks by natively working with arithmetic expression, while mimicking the
basic ideas of Cooper’s algorithm and incorporating domain-specific optimisations.
5.2 Maximum Elimination
The first step is to reduce the problem of eliminating general maxx|b (p) terms to
those in which b and p come from a simpler restricted grammar. These simple per-
mission expressions p do not contain general conditional expressions (b′ ? p1 : p2),
but instead only those of the form (b′ ? r : 0) (where r is a constant or rd).
Furthermore, simple permission expressions only contain subtractions of the form
p− (b′ ?r : 0). This is achieved in a precursory rewriting of the input expression by,
for instance, distributing pointwise maxima over conditional expressions and bi-
nary maxima. For example, the pointwise maximum term (part of the copyEven ex-
ample): maxj|0≤j<len(a) ((j%2=0 ? (qa=a ∧ qi=j ? rd : 0) : (qa=a ∧ qi=j ? 1 : 0)))
will be reduced to:
max( maxj|0≤j<len(a)∧j%2=0 ((qa=a ∧ qi=j ? rd : 0)),
maxj|0≤j<len(a)∧j%2 6=0 ((qa=a ∧ qi=j ? 1 : 0)))
Arbitrarily-small Values. We exploit a high-level case-split in our algorithm
design analogous to Cooper’s: given a pointwise maximum expression maxx|b (p),
either a smallest value of x exists such that p has its maximal value (and b is true),
or there are arbitrarily small values of x defining this maximal value. To handle the
arbitrarily small case, we define a completely analogous 〈〈p〉〉−∞(x) function, which
recursively replaces all boolean expressions b′ in p with 〈〈b′〉〉−∞(x) as computed
by Cooper; we relegate the definition to Sec. B.3. We then use (b′ ? p′ : 0), where
(b′, δ1) = 〈〈b〉〉−∞(x) and (p′, δ2) = 〈〈p〉〉−∞(x), as our expression in this case. Note
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〈〈(b ? p : 0)〉〉smallmax(x) = (T, δ), where (S, δ) = 〈〈b〉〉small(x), T = {(e, true) | e ∈ S}
〈〈p1 + p2〉〉smallmax(x) = (T1 ∪ T2, lcm(δ1, δ2))
where (T1, δ1) = 〈〈p1〉〉smallmax(x), (T2, δ2) = 〈〈p2〉〉smallmax(x)
〈〈max(p1, p2)〉〉smallmax(x) = 〈〈min(p1, p2)〉〉smallmax(x) = 〈〈p1 + p2〉〉smallmax(x) as above
〈〈p1 − (b ? p : 0)〉〉smallmax(x) = (T1 ∪ T2, lcm(δ1, δ2))
where (T1, δ1) = 〈〈p1〉〉smallmax(x), (S2, δ2) = 〈〈¬b〉〉small(x),
T ′2 = {(e, p1 > 0) | e ∈ S2}
〈〈(p, b)〉〉smallmax(x) = (Tp ∪ T ′b, δ′) where (Tp, δp) = 〈〈p〉〉smallmax(x), (Sb, δb) = 〈〈b〉〉small(x),
δ′ = lcm(δp, δb), (b′, δb) = 〈〈b〉〉−∞(x), (p′, δp) = 〈〈p〉〉−∞(x),
T ′b = {(eb, (
∨
d∈[0,δ′−1]
((¬b′ ∧ p′ > 0)[d/x])) ∨
∨
(ep,bp)∈Tp
dp∈[0,δp−1]
(¬b ∧ bp)[(ep + dp)/x]) | eb ∈ Sb}
Fig. 5: Filtered boundary expression computation.
that this expression still depends on x if it contains (non-)divisibility constraints;
Thm. 4 shows how x can be eliminated using δ1 and δ2.
Selecting Boundary Expressions for Maximum Elimination. Next, we
consider the case of selecting an appropriate set of boundary expressions, given a
max
x|b
(p) term. We define this first for p in isolation, and then give an extended
definition accounting for the b. Just as for Cooper’s algorithm, the boundary
expressions must be a set guaranteed to include the smallest value of x defining
the maximum value in question. The set must be finite, and be as small as
possible for efficiency of our overall algorithm. We refine the notion of boundary
expression, and compute a set of pairs (e, b′) of integer expression e and its
filter condition b′: the filter condition represents an additional condition under
which e must be included as a boundary expression. In particular, in contexts
where b′ is false, e can be ignored; this gives us a way to symbolically define an
ultimately-smaller set of boundary expressions, particularly in the absence of
contextual information which might later show b′ to be false. We call these pairs
filtered boundary expressions.
Definition 1 (Filtered Boundary Expressions). The filtered boundary ex-
pression computation for x in p, written 〈〈p〉〉smallmax(x), returns a pair of a set T
of pairs (e, b′), and an integer constant δ, as defined in Fig. 5. This definition is
also overloaded with a definition of filtered boundary expression computation for
(x | b) in p, written 〈〈(p, b)〉〉smallmax(x).
Just as for Cooper’s 〈〈b〉〉small(x) computation, our function 〈〈p〉〉smallmax(x) computes
the set T of (e, b′) pairs along with a single integer constant δ, which is the least
common multiple of the divisors occurring in p; the desired smallest value of x
may actually be some e+ d where d ∈ [0, δ − 1]. There are three key points to
Def. 1 which ultimately make our algorithm efficient:
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First, the case for 〈〈(b ? p : 0)〉〉smallmax(x) only includes boundary expressions
for making b true. The case of b being false (from the structure of the permission
expression) is not relevant for trying to maximise the permission expression’s
value (note that this case will never apply under a subtraction operator, due
to our simplified grammar, and the case for subtraction not recursing into the
right-hand operand).
Second, the case for 〈〈p1 − (b ? p : 0)〉〉smallmax(x) dually only considers boundary
expressions for making b false (along with the boundary expressions for maximis-
ing p1). The filter condition p1 > 0 is used to drop the boundary expressions for
making b false; in case p1 is not strictly positive we know that the evaluation of
the whole permission expression will not yield a strictly-positive value, and hence
is not an interesting boundary value for a non-negative maximum.
Third, in the overloaded definition of 〈〈(p, b)〉〉smallmax(x), we combine boundary
expressions for p with those for b. The boundary expressions for b are, however,
superfluous if, in analysing p we have already determined a value for x which
maximises p and happens to satisfy b. If all boundary expressions for p (whose
filter conditions are true) make b true, and all non-trivial (i.e. strictly positive)
evaluations of 〈〈p〉〉−∞(x) used for potentially defining p’s maximum value also
satisfy b, then we can safely discard the boundary expressions for b.
We are now ready to reduce pointwise maximum expressions to equivalent
maximum expressions over finitely-many cases:
Theorem 4 (Simple Maximum Expression Elimination). For any pair
(p, b), if |= p ≥ 0, then we have:
|= max
x|b
p = max
(
max
(e,b′′)∈T
d∈[0,δ−1]
(b′′ ∧ b[e+ d/x] ? p[e+ d/x] : 0)),
max
d∈[0,lcm(δ1,δ2)−1]
(b′[d/x] ? p′[d/x] : 0)
)
where (T, δ) = 〈〈(p, b)〉〉smallmax(x), (b′, δ1) = 〈〈b〉〉−∞(x) and (p′, δ2) = 〈〈p〉〉−∞(x).
To see how our filter conditions help to keep the set T (and therefore, the
first iterated maximum on the right of the equality in the above theorem) small,
consider the example: maxx|x≥0 ((x=i ? 1 : 0)) (so p is (x=i?1:0), while b is x ≥ 0).
In this case, evaluating 〈〈(p, b)〉〉smallmax(x) yields the set T = {(i, true), (0, i < 0)}
with the meaning that the boundary expression i is considered in all cases, while
the boundary expression 0 is only of interest if i < 0. The first iterated maximum
term would be max((true ∧ i≥0 ? (i=i ? 1 : 0) : 0), (i<0 ∧ 0≥0 ? (0=i ? 1 : 0) : 0)).
We observe that the term corresponding to the boundary value 0 can be simplified
to 0 since it contains the two contradictory conditions i < 0 and 0 = i. Thus, the
entire maximum can be simplified to (i≥0 ? 1 : 0). Without the filter conditions
the result would instead be max((i≥0 ? 1 : 0), (0=i ? 1 : 0)). In the context of our
permission analysis, the filter conditions allow us to avoid generating boundary
expressions corresponding e.g. to the integer loop invariants, provided that the
expressions generated by analysing the permission expression in question already
suffice. We employ aggressive syntactic simplification of the resulting expressions,
in order to exploit these filter conditions to produce succinct final answers.
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Program LOC Loops Size Prec. Time
addLast 12 1 (1) 1.9 3 21
append 13 1 (1) 1.9 3 32
array1 17 2 (2) 0.9 7 28
array2 23 3 (2) 0.9 7 35
array3 23 2 (2) 1.1 3 24
arrayRev 18 1 (1) 3.2 3* 28
bubbleSort 23 2 (2) 1.8 3* 34
copy 16 2 (1) 1.6 3 27
copyEven 17 1 (1) 1.6 3 27
copyEven2 14 1 (1) 1.4 7 20
copyEven3 14 1 (1) 2.2 3* 23
copyOdd 21 2 (1) 2.4 3 55
copyOddBug 19 2 (1) 7.1 3 57
copyPart 17 2 (1) 1.7 3 30
countDown 21 3 (2) 1.1 3 32
diff 31 2 (2) 2.0 7 70
find 19 1 (1) 3.0 3 43
findNonNull 19 1 (1) 3.0 3 40
init 18 2 (1) 1.1 3 28
init2d 23 2 (2) 2.1 3 52
initEven 18 2 (1) 0.9 7 26
initEvenbug 18 2 (1) 1.5 7 28
initNonCnst 18 2 (1) 1.1 3 27
initPart 19 2 (1) 1.1 3 30
Program LOC Loops Size Prec. Time
initPartBug 19 2 (1) 1.5 3 31
insertSort 21 2 (2) 2.5 3* 35
javaBubble 24 2 (2) 2.3 3* 32
knapsack 21 2 (2) 1.3 7 45
lis 37 4 (2) 4.2 3 73
matrixmult 33 3 (3) 1.5 3 78
mergeinter 23 2 (1) 3.4 7 56
mergeintbug 23 2 (1) 2.6 7 59
memcopy 16 2 (1) 1.6 3 28
multarray 26 2 (2) 2.1 3 40
parcopy 20 2 (1) 1.2 3 30
pararray 20 2 (1) 1.2 3 31
parCopyEven 22 2 (1) 5.0 3* 79
parMatrix 35 4 (2) 1.1 3 80
parNested 31 4 (2) 0.5 7 57
relax 33 1 (1) 1.4 3* 55
reverse 21 2 (1) 3.9 3 42
reverseBug 21 2 (1) 1.7 3 42
sanfoundry 27 2 (1) 2.1 3 37
selectSort 26 2 (2) 1.0 7 38
strCopy 16 2 (1) 0.9 7 21
strLen 10 1 (1) 0.8 7 15
swap 15 1 (1) 1.5 3 19
swapBug 15 1 (1) 1.5 3 19
Table 1: Experimental results. For each program, we list the lines of code and the
number of loops (in brackets the nesting depth). We report the relative size of
the inferred specifications compared to hand-written specifications, and whether
the inferred specifications are precise (a star next to the tick indicates slightly
more precise than hand-written specifications). Inference times are given in ms.
6 Implementation and Experimental Evaluation
We have developed a prototype implementation of our permission inference. The
tool is written in Scala and accepts programs written in the Viper language [38],
which provides all the features needed for our purposes.
Given a Viper program, the tool first performs a forward numerical analysis
to infer the over-approximate loop invariants needed for our handling of loops.
The implementation is parametric in the numerical abstract domain used for
the analysis; we currently support the abstract domains provided by the Apron
library [24]. As we have yet to integrate the implementation of under-approximate
invariants (e.g., [35]), we rely on user-provided invariants, or assume them to be
false if none are provided. In a second step, our tool performs the inference and
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maximum elimination. Finally, it annotates the input program with the inferred
specification.
We evaluated our implementation on 43 programs taken from various sources;
included are all programs that do not contain strings from the array memory
safety category of SV-COMP 2017, all programs from Dillig et al. [15] (except
three examples involving arrays of arrays), loop parallelisation examples from
VerCors [5], and a few programs that we crafted ourselves. We manually checked
that our soundness condition holds for all considered programs. The parallel loop
examples were encoded as two consecutive loops where the first one models the
forking of one thread per loop iteration (by iteratively exhaling the permissions
required for all loop iterations), and the second one models the joining of all
these threads (by inhaling the permissions that are left after each loop iteration).
For the numerical analysis we used the polyhedra abstract domain provided by
Apron. The experiments were performed on a dual core machine with a 2.60
GHz Intel Core i7-6600U CPU, running Ubuntu 16.04.
An overview of the results is given in Table 1. For each program, we compared
the size and precision of the inferred specification with respect to hand-written
ones. The running times were measured by first running the analysis 50 times
to warm up the JVM and then computing the average time needed over the
next 100 runs. The results show that the inference is very efficient. The inferred
specifications are concise for the vast majority of the examples. In 35 out of 48
cases, our inference inferred precise specifications. Most of the imprecisions are due
to the inferred numerical loop invariants. In all cases, manually strengthening the
invariants yields a precise specification. In one example, the source of imprecision
is our abstraction of array-dependent conditions (see Sec. 4).
7 Related Work
Much work is dedicated to the analysis of array programs, but most of it focuses on
array content, whereas we infer permission specifications. The simplest approach
consists of “smashing” all array elements into a single memory location [4]. This
is generally quite imprecise, as only weak updates can be performed on the
smashed array. A simple alternative is to consider array elements as distinct
variables [4], which is feasible only when the length of the array is statically-known.
More-advanced approaches perform syntax-based [18,22,25] or semantics-based
[13,34] partitions of an array into symbolic segments. These require segments
to be contiguous (with the exception of [34]), and do not easily generalise to
multidimensional arrays, unlike our approach. Gulwani et al. [20] propose an
approach for inferring quantified invariants for arrays by lifting quantifier-free
abstract domains. Their technique requires templates for the invariants.
Dillig et al. [15] avoid an explicit array partitioning by maintaining constraints
that over- and under-approximate the array elements being updated by a program
statement. Their work employs a technique for directly generalising the analysis
of a single loop iteration (based on quantifier elimination), which works well
when different loop iterations write to disjoint array locations. Gedell and Hähnle
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[17] provide an analysis which uses a similar criterion to determine that it is
safe to parallelise a loop, and treat its heap updates as one bulk effect. The
condition for our projection over loop iterations is weaker, since it allows the
same array location to be updated in multiple loop iterations (like for example
in sorting algorithms). Blom et al. [5] provide a specification technique for a
variety of parallel loop constructs; our work can infer the specifications which
their technique requires to be provided.
Another alternative for generalising the effect of a loop iteration is to use a
first order theorem prover as proposed by Kovács and Voronkov [28]. In their
work, however, they did not consider nested loops or multidimensional arrays.
Other works rely on loop acceleration techniques [1,7]. In particular, like ours,
the work of Bozga et al. [7] does not synthesise loop invariants; they directly infer
post-conditions of loops with respect to given preconditions, while we additionally
infer the preconditions. The acceleration technique proposed in [1] is used for
the verification of array programs in the tool Booster [2].
Monniaux and Gonnord [36] describe an approach for the verification of array
programs via a transformation to array-free Horn clauses. Chakraborty et al. [11]
use heuristics to determine the array accesses performed by a loop iteration and
split the verification of an array invariant accordingly. Their non-interference
condition between loop iterations is similar to, but stronger than our soundness
condition (cf. Sec. 4). Neither work is concerned with specification inference.
A wide range of static/shape analyses employ tailored separation logics as
abstract domain (e.g., [3,19,10,29,41]); these works handle recursively-defined data
structures such as linked lists and trees, but not random-access data structures
such as arrays and matrices. Of these, Gulavani et al. [19] is perhaps closest to
our work: they employ an integer-indexed domain for describing recursive data
structures. It would be interesting to combine our work with such separation logic
shape analyses. The problems of automating biabduction and entailment checking
for array-based separation logics have been recently studied by Brotherston et
al. [8] and Kimura et al. [27], but have not yet been extended to handle loop-based
or recursive programs.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
We presented a precise and efficient permission inference for array programs.
Although our inferred specifications contain redundancies in some cases, they are
human readable. Our approach integrates well with permission-based inference
for other data structures and with permission-based program verification.
As future work, we plan to use SMT solving to further simplify our inferred
specifications, to support arrays of arrays, and to extend our work to an inter-
procedural analysis and explore its combination with biabduction techniques.
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pre(skip, p) = p
pre((s1; s2), p) = pre(s1, pre(s2, p))
pre(x:=e, p) = p[e/x]
pre(x:=a[e], p) = max(p[a[e]/x], αa,e(rd))
pre(a[e]:=x, p) = max(p[a′[e′] 7→ (e = e′ ∧ a = a′ ? x : a′[e′])], αa,e(1))
pre(exhale(a, e, p′), p) = p+ αa,e(p′)
pre(inhale(a, e, p′), p) = max(0, p↓(a,e) − αa,e(p′))
pre(if(b) { s1 } else { s2 }, p) = (b ? pre(s1, p) : pre(s2, p))
∆(skip, p) = p
∆(x:=e, p) = p[e/x]
∆(x:=a[e], p) = p[a[e]/x]
∆(a[e]:=x, p) = p[a′[e′] 7→ (e = e′ ∧ a = a′ ? x : a′[e′])]
∆(exhale(a, e, p′), p) = p− αa,e(p′)
∆(inhale(a, e, p′), p) = p↑(a,e) + αa,e(p′)
∆(if(b) { s1 } else { s2 }, p) = (b ? ∆(s1, p) : ∆(s2, p))
Fig. 6: The full inhale statement rules for the permission preconditions and
relative permission differences.
A Auxiliary Inference Definitions
Definition 2 (Sufficient Permission Preconditions). A permission expres-
sion p denotes a sufficient permission precondition for a statement s iff, for
all states (H,P, σ) satisfying ∀va, j.P (va, j) ≥ [[p]](H,σ[qa 7→va][qi 7→j]), we have:
<s, (H,P, σ)> 6−→∗ perm-fail.
Here, p may mention the designated variables qa and qi to denote the memory
location of array qa at index qi, and [[p]](H,σ[qa 7→a][qi 7→n]) denotes the evaluation
of p in the given heap and environment.
Definition 3 (Guaranteed Permission Postconditions). If p is a sufficient
permission precondition for a statement s then a permission expression p′ is a
corresponding guaranteed permission postcondition for s w.r.t. p iff the follow-
ing condition holds: For all initial states (H,P, σ) satisfying ∀va, j.P (va, j) ≥
[[p]](H,σ[qa 7→va][qi 7→j]), and for all final states (H
′, P ′, σ′)such that <s, (H,P, σ)> −→∗
<skip, (H ′, P ′, σ′)>, we have: ∀va, j.P ′(va, j) ≥ [[p′]](H,σ[qa 7→va][qi 7→j]).
Note that guaranteed permission postconditions are expressed in terms of
pre-states are, thus, are evaluated in H and σ (rather than H ′ and σ′.
A.1 Conditional Approximation
For the handling of loops we need to abstract away array lookups in order to
account for the possibility that the corresponding array value is changed by the
loop. Next, we describe the operators used to facilitate that. For every boolean
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expression b, we define an over-approximation b↑ and and under-approximation
b↓ such that b |= b↑ and b↓ |= b independently of the program state. The over-
approximation of a comparison e1 op e2, where op ∈ {=, 6=, <,≤, >,≥}, is given
by
(e1 op e2)↑ =
{
true if e1 or e2 contains any array lookup
e1 op e2 otherwise.
The under-approximation (e1 op e2)↓ is defined completely analogously with the
only difference that the true is replaced with false. For all remaining boolean
expressions the approximation is defined recursively; for instance (b1 ∧ b2)↑ =
b↑1 ∧ b↑2 and (¬b)↑ = ¬(b↓).
We extend the notion of over- and under-approximation to permission expres-
sions p. Here, we want that p ≤ p↑ and p↓ ≤ p hold independently of the program
state. Again, these operators are defined recursively on the structure of the
permission expression in a straight forward manner, two of the more complicated
cases are (b ? p1 : p2)↑ = max((b↑ ? p↑1 : 0), ((¬b)↑ ? p↑2 : 0)) and (p1− p2)↑ = p↑1− p↓2.
Now, assume that p is the precondition or difference inferred for the code after
an inhale(a, e, p′) statement. If the permission expression p mentions the array
value a[e] then it might be the case that we do not have the required permissions
to talk about a[e] in the state before the inhale statement. To account for this,
we introduce two refined abstraction operators that over- and under-approximate
all array lookups referring to a[e] in a permission expression p. These operators,
denoted p↑(a,e) and p↓(a,e), are defined similarly to p↑ and p↓, respectively. The
only difference to the regular over- and under-approximation operators are the
base cases for comparisons:
(e1 op e2)↑(a,e) = (
∨
(a′,e′)∈A
(a′ = a ∧ e′ = e) ? true : e1 op e2),
where A is the set of all tuples (a′, e′) such that the array access a′[e′] appears
in e1 op e2. In the expression above, we use (b0 ? b1 : b2) as a shorthand for
(¬b0 ∨ b1) ∧ (b0 ∨ b2). Again, the under-approximate version (e1 op e2)↓(a,e) is
defined analogously but with true replaced with false.
A.2 Full Permission Inference Definitions
See Fig. 6 for the full definitions of our permission precondition and relative
permission difference inference. The differences with respect to Fig. 4 are in
the inhale cases, which take account for the case of holding no permission to a
particular location before the inhale statement — if it is only the inhale operation
which makes the location accessible afterwards, then one needs to model that
other threads/method invocations could have been modifying this location in
the meantime. This is reflected by soundly eliminating any dependency on the
corresponding array location, when pushing information backwards over the
inhale statement.
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Definition 4 (Auxiliary Permission Notions). For any heap H, environ-
ment σ, permission map P and permission-expression p, we write P ≥ [[p]](H,σ) to
mean, for all array values va and integer values vi, P (va, vi) ≥ [[p]](H,σ[qa 7→va][qi 7→vi])
(i.e., the permission map P holds more permissions, pointwise.
For two permission expressions p1 and p2, we write [[p1]](H,σ) ≥ [[p2]](H,σ) to
denote an analogous pointwise inequality.
For permission maps P1 and P2, we write P1 − P2 to denote the permission map
defined by the pointwise subtraction of the values in the two maps.
We introduce a definition of a statement being well-behaved with respect to
our analysis results: effectively, a well-behaved statement is one for which our
analysis is sound (we later show that all statements are well-behaved, in this
sense, provided that the hypotheses of Thm. 3 hold).
Definition 5 (Well-behaved statements). A statement s is well-behaved if
∀p1, p2, H, P, σ,H ′, P ′, s′, if P ≥ [[pre(s, p1)]](H,σ) then:
1. <s, (H,P, σ)> 6−→∗ perm-fail, and,
2. If <s, (H,P, σ)> −→∗ <s′, (H ′, P ′, σ′)>, then:
(a) P ′ ≥ [[pre(s′, p1)]](H′,σ′), and,
(b) (P ′ − P ) ≥ ([[∆(s, p2)]](H,σ) − [[∆(s′, p2)]](H′,σ′)
The following lemma reflects the definition of our pre and ∆ operators for
sequential compositions:
Lemma 1 (Composition of well-behaved statements). For any well-behaved
statements s1, s2, . . . , sn (and any n > 0), the iterated sequential composition
(s1; (s2; (. . . ; sn))) is well-behaved.
Proof. By straightforward induction on n.
Theorem 1. Let while (b) { s } be an exhale-free loop, let x be the integer
variables modified by s, and let I+ be a sound over-approximating numerical
loop invariant (over the integer variables in s). Then maxx|I+∧b (pre(s, 0)↑) is a
sufficient permission precondition for while (b) { s }.
Proof. We show here the (technically weaker) result, that if pre(s, 0) is a sufficient
permission precondition for s, then our theorem here holds. This additional
hypothesis is obtained from the overall inductive soundness proof of our analysis
(Thm. 3, below); from this, the proof of the originally stated theorem directly
follows.
We can then prove the result by showing that for any finite number n of
unrollings of the loop performed by the execution of while (b) { s }, we do not
encounter a permission failure, and retain at least maxx|I+∧b (pre(s, 0)↑) permis-
sions. The proof proceeds by induction on n. In the inductive case, since I+ is a
sound over-approximating loop invariant, we must have σ |= I+∧b (note that these
expressions are independent of the heap). Therefore, [[maxx|I+∧b (pre(s, 0)↑)]](H,σ) ≥
[[pre(s, 0)↑]](H,σ) ≥ [[pre(s, 0)]](H,σ), and so the evaluation of s cannot result in a
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permission failure, since our hypothesis was that pre(s, 0) is a sufficient permis-
sion precondition for s. Furthermore, since s is exhale-free, we are guaranteed to
hold at least as many permissions after execution of s as before, and so we can
apply our induction hypothesis to conclude.
Lemma 2. Given a loop while (b) { s }, let x be the integer variables modified
in s and let v and v′ be two fresh sets of variables, one for each of x. Suppose
that the following implication is valid:
(I+ ∧ b)[v/x] ∧ (I+ ∧ b)[v′/x] ∧ (∨ v 6= v′) ⇒
max(pre(s, 0)↑[v/x], pre(s, 0)↑[v′/x]) ≥ pre(s, pre(s, 0)↑[v′/x])↑[v/x]
Then, it follows that, for any n ≥ 0, and n fresh sets of variables v1, v2, . . . , vn,
the following implication is also valid:∧
1≤j≤n (I+ ∧ b)[vj/x] ∧ (
∧
1≤j<k≤n
∨
vj 6= vk) ⇒
( max
1≤j≤n
pre(s, 0)↑[vj/x]) ≥ pre(s, pre(s, . . . pre(s, 0)↑[vn/x] . . .)↑[v2/x])↑[v1/x]
Proof. The proof follows by straightforward induction on n.
Theorem 2 (Soundness Condition for Loop Preconditions). Given a loop
while (b) { s }, let x be the integer variables modified in s and let v and v′ be
two fresh sets of variables, one for each of x. Then maxx|I+∧b (pre(s, 0)↑) is a
sufficient permission precondition for while (b) { s } if the following implication
is valid in all states:
(I+ ∧ b)[v/x] ∧ (I+ ∧ b)[v′/x] ∧ (∨ v 6= v′) ⇒
max(pre(s, 0)↑[v/x], pre(s, 0)↑[v′/x]) ≥ pre(s, pre(s, 0)↑[v′/x])↑[v/x]
Proof. As for the previous theorem, we show here the weaker result (which nonethe-
less fits into our overall inductive soundness argument), that if, for any n se-
quential compositions of s with itself (s; (s; (. . . ; s))), the permission expression
pre((s; (s; (. . . ; s))), 0) is a sufficient permission precondition for (s; (s; (. . . ; s))),
then the desired result holds (the proof then essentially shows that our precondi-
tion for the whole loop is at least as large as the precondition for this unrolled
statement). The theorem in its originally-stated form is again a corollary of
Thm. 3.
We show that, for any such n unrollings of the loop, |= maxx|I+∧b (pre(s, 0)↑) ≥
pre((s; (s; (. . . ; s))), 0). Since each initial state of a loop execution is guaranteed to
satisfy I+ ∧ b, and without loss of generality (adding a loop counter if necessary,
as discussed in Sec. 4), we can assume that these states are pairwise distinct
when considering only the values of variables, we obtain the result from Lemma 2,
above.
Our overall soundness result is ultimately handled by the following technical
lemma:
Lemma 3. For all statements s, if all loops occurrings in s are either exhale-free
or satisfy the condition of Thm. 2, then s is well-behaved.
23
Proof. In order to prove the result, we need to instrument the program in question
with auxiliary information: we annotate each loop with a pair (I+, I−), which
are initially its over- and under-approximate loop invariants, respectively. We
need to record both the original forms of these invariants, and a pair of invariants
which we use as auxiliary state during execution of the corresponding loop. This
updateable pair of loop invariants is adjusted during execution: every time a
new iteration of the loop is started, we conjoin an additional conjunct to both
invariants, expressing that this particular initial state of the loop iteration cannot
be seen again. The rules for pre and ∆ for the remaining loop iterations take
account of the currently-updated versions of these two invariants; this is critical
for the inductive step to go through. For example, this allows a loop iteration
to exhale some permissions, and for the remaining copy of the loop code not to
require the permissions for exactly that iteration again. Since this instrumentation
does not affect the steps of program execution, we can be sure that our result also
holds for the uninstrumented version of the operational semantics.
The proof then proceeds by structural induction on s (see also the comment be-
low the lemma). The parameterisation of the definition of well-behaved statements
by the additional permission expressions p1 and p2 allows for the inductive cases
for sequential compositions to be handled simply: we can plug in the appropriate
intermediate results computed by our pre and ∆ operators. The case for loops is
(as expected), the most involved, and uses either Thm. 1 or Thm. 2 to rule out
the possibility of permission failures. The fact that the gain or loss of permissions
during execution results in a state with at least as many permissions as predicted
by our ∆ operator follows from the inductive argument.
It may be surprising that the proof runs by structural induction on s, even in a
language with loops; the reason this works is that the notion of being well-behaved
builds in all finite unrollings of the statement, and our lemmas and case regarding
projecting our specifications for loops need to handle all such unrollings at once,
in the proof.
Our main soundness result is now a direct corollary of the above lemma:
Theorem 3 (Soundness of Permission Inference). For any statement s, if
every while loop in s either is exhale-free or satisfies the condition of Thm. 2
then pre(s, 0) is a sufficient permission precondition for s, and pre(s, 0) + ∆(s, 0)
is a corresponding guaranteed permission postcondition.
Proof. By Lemma 3, s is well-behaved; instantiating both p1 and p2 in the defini-
tion of being well-behaved yields the result directly.
B Auxiliary Maximum Elimination Definitions and
Proofs
B.1 Simplified Grammars
The first step in our solution is to reduce a general maximum-elimination problem
to several smaller maximum problems over simpler grammars of permission and
boolean expressions; these simplified grammars are defined as follows:
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Definition 6 (Simple boolean and permission expressions over x.). The
grammars of simple boolean expressions over x and simple permission expressions
over x, are defined as follows:
b ::= b1 ∧ b2 | b1 ∨ b2 | (x+e)%n=0 | (x+e)%n 6=0 | x op e | b′
where x 6∈ FV(b′) and, in all cases x /∈ FV(e) op ∈ {=, 6=, <,≤, >,≥}
p ::= (b ? r : 0) | p1 + p2 | p1 − (b ? r : 0) |
max(p1, p2) | min(p1, p2) r ::= q | rd
Simple permission expressions must additionally satisfy the restriction that no
addition operators have subexpressions with subtraction operators inside them.
A maximum expression maxx|b (p) is simple if both b and p are simple over x.
We write true and false as shorthands for 0 = 0 and 0 6= 0, respectively. For simple
boolean expressions b, we write ¬b as shorthand for the simple boolean expression
obtained by pushing the negation down, flipping connectives and literals to their
duals, e.g. ¬((x+ e)%n=0 ∧ x > 0) is shorthand for (x+ e)%n 6=0 ∨ x ≤ 0.
The reduction of boolean expressions to simple boolean expressions is handled
following the initial steps of Cooper’s Quantifier Elimination procedure [12], briefly
summarised as follows. Firstly, each boolean expression should be converted to
negation normal form (pushing all negations down to individual literals). Next, all
occurrences of x in literals are grouped such that there is at most one occurrence
(e.g. rewriting x+ 3 > 2− x as 2 · x > −1). If the resulting boolean expressions
contain different coefficients for x, these literals are then “multiplied out” such
that each contains only d · x for some common integer constant d. If d 6= 1, we
then replace d · x with a fresh variable x′ throughout, and conjoin x′%d=0 to
the condition b′ filtering the maximum expression. For each converted boolean
expression, the values of x′ making the resulting expression true are exactly the
values x′/d of x making the original boolean expression true. This multiplying-out
step needs to be performed across the entire maximum expression in question; if
several such steps are performed, then the multiplication is by the lowest common
multiple of them all.
We reduce the problem of finding a method for eliminating general maxx|b (p)
expressions to that of eliminating simple maximum expressions, as follows. For
the permission expression p in question, we first distribute any + and − operators
over max, min and conditional expressions in which the second branch is not
simply 0. For example, we rewrite max(p1, p2) + p3 as max(p1 + p3, p2 + p3).
In this way, we obtain an expression maxx|b (p) in which any occurrences of
max, min and conditional expressions of this are nested at the top level. Note
that propagating subtraction over a max as its second operand requires the
introduction of a min term - this is the motivation for including them in our
grammar. The restriction of Def. 6 that subtraction operators do not occur
under addition operators can be achieved with further rewritings; e.g. rewriting
p1 + (p2 − (b ? r : 0)) to (p2 + p1)− (b ? r : 0).
We now eliminate conditional expressions, and as many max operators as
possible, by repeatedly applying the following two equalities (read from left-to-
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〈〈b〉〉small(x) = (∅, 1) if x /∈ FV(b)
〈〈x = e〉〉small(x) = 〈〈x ≥ e〉〉small(x) = ({e}, 1)
〈〈x 6= e〉〉small(x) = 〈〈x > e〉〉small(x) = ({e+1}, 1)
〈〈x ≤ e〉〉small(x) = 〈〈x < e〉〉small(x) = (∅, 1)
〈〈(x+ e)%n=0〉〉small(x) = 〈〈(x+ e)%n6=0〉〉small(x) = (∅, n)
〈〈b1 ∧ b2〉〉small(x) = 〈〈b1 ∨ b2〉〉small(x) = (S1 ∪ S2, lcm(δ1, δ2))
where (S1, δ1) = 〈〈b1〉〉small(x) and (S2, δ2) = 〈〈b2〉〉small(x)
Fig. 7: Boundary Expression Selection for Simple Boolean Expressions
right) throughout the permission expression:
max
x|b
max(p1, p2) = max(max
x|b
p1,max
x|b
p2)
max
x|b
(b′ ? p1 : p2) =

(b′ ? max
x|b
p1 : max
x|b
p2) if p2 6= 0 and x /∈ FV(b′)
max( max
x|b∧b′
p1, max
x|b∧¬b′
p2) if p2 6= 0 and x ∈ FV(b′)
This yields a number of pointwise maximum terms to solve, each of which
is simple over x. For example, when computing a precondition for the loop
in the copyEven example (projecting the precondition for the loop body using
the loop condition and integer invariant), we generate the pointwise maximum
max
j|0≤j∧j<len(a)
(j%2=0 ? (qa = a ∧ qi = j ? rd : 0) : (qa = a ∧ qi = j ? 1 : 0)) which we
rewrite here to:
max( max
j|0≤j∧j<len(a)∧j%2=0
(qa = a ∧ qi = j ? rd : 0),
max
j|0≤j∧j<len(a)∧j%2 6=0
(qa = a ∧ qi = j ? 1 : 0))
B.2 Quantifier Elimination and Maximum Elimination Lemmas
Definition 7 (Boundary Expression Selection for Booleans [12]). The
boundary expression selection for x in b is written 〈〈b〉〉small(x), returning a pair
of a set S of integer-typed expressions, and an integer constant δ, as defined in
Fig. 7.
For e.g. the literal x = 4, it is clear that the value 4 is the smallest value for x
making the literal true. For x 6= 4, the boundary value 5 is generated; although
there are smaller values making the literal true, this is the only one with the
property that the next smallest value does not. To understand the role of the δ
result returned, consider the input expression x 6= 4 ∧ x%3=0. While 5 remains a
boundary value for the first literal, this value does not make the whole formula
true; it “misses” the divisibility constraint by being slightly too small. For this
reason, the actual set of terms represented by the output pair (S, δ) should be
understood to be {e + d | e ∈ S ∧ d ∈ [0, δ − 1]}; the δ result is used to catch
these missing cases. For the above formula, the resulting set would be {5, 6, 7},
which indeed includes the smallest value for x satisfying x 6= 4 ∧ x%3=0.
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〈〈b〉〉−∞(x) = (b, 1) if x /∈ FV(b)
〈〈x = e〉〉−∞(x) = 〈〈x ≥ e〉〉−∞(x) = 〈〈x > e〉〉−∞(x) = (false, 1)
〈〈x 6= e〉〉−∞(x) = 〈〈x ≤ e〉〉−∞(x) = 〈〈x < e〉〉−∞(x) = (true, 1)
〈〈(x+ e)%n=0〉〉−∞(x) = ((x+ e)%n=0, n) 〈〈(x+ e)%n6=0〉〉−∞(x) = ((x+ e)%n6=0, n)
〈〈b1 ∧ b2〉〉−∞(x) = (b′1 ∧ b′2, lcm(δ1, δ2)) 〈〈b1 ∨ b2〉〉−∞(x) = (b′1 ∨ b′2, lcm(δ1, δ2))
where (b′1, δ1) = 〈〈b1〉〉−∞(x) where (b′1, δ1) = 〈〈b1〉〉−∞(x)
(b′2, δ2) = 〈〈b2〉〉−∞(x) (b′2, δ2) = 〈〈b2〉〉−∞(x)
Fig. 8: Left Infinite Projection for Simple Boolean Expressions
Lemma 4. For all simple boolean expressions b, environments σ and integer
expressions n, if (S, δ) = 〈〈b〉〉small(x) and σ |= b[n/x] then, for all integer constants
m > 0, either:
1. ∃e ∈ S, d ∈ [0,m·δ − 1]. σ |= n = e+ d, or:
2. σ |= b[(n−m·δ)/x]
Proof. By straightforward induction over the definition of 〈〈b〉〉small(x) (note that the
structure of b decreases on every recursive call (cf. Fig. 7). The ∀m quantification
is a necessary generalisation for the inductive argument to go through, to handle
the recalculation of δ to be the lowest-common-multiple of the values from the
recursive calls, in the conjunction and disjunction cases.
Lemma 5. Given a simple boolean expression b (over x), and an environment
σ, if σ |= ∃y.b[y/x] ∧ ∀z.z < y ⇒ ¬b[z/x] then σ |= (∃x.b)⇔
∨
e∈S
d∈[0,δ−1]
b[e+ d/x],
where (S, δ) = 〈〈b〉〉small(x).
Proof. The hypothesis σ |= ∃y.b[y/x] ∧ ∀z.z < y ⇒ ¬b[z/x] expresses that the
existentially-bound value y is the smallest value for x such that b holds; in
particular, σ |= b[y/x]. Therefore, by Lemma4, we must have ∃e ∈ S, d ∈
[0,m·δ − 1]. σ |= y = e+ d (since the second case of the lemma contradicts our
hypothesis). Therefore, σ |= b[e+ d/x] for some such e and d, and the required
disjunction is implied.
Definition 8 (Left-Infinite Projection for Boolean Expressions [12]).
The left-infinite projection of b, written 〈〈b〉〉−∞(x) is defined by the rules of Fig. 8.
Lemma 6. For all simple boolean expressions b, and environments σ, there exists
an integer constant m such that, for all expressions e:
σ |= e ≤ m⇒ (b[e/x]⇔ b′[(e%δ)/x])
where (b′, δ) = 〈〈b〉〉−∞(x)
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〈〈b〉〉−∞(x) = b if x /∈ FV(b)
〈〈(b ? r : 0)〉〉−∞(x) = ((b′ ? r : 0), δ) where (b′, δ) = 〈〈b〉〉−∞(x)
〈〈p1 + p2〉〉−∞(x) = (p′1 + p′2, δ) where
(p′1, δ1) = 〈〈p1〉〉−∞(x), (p′2, δ2) = 〈〈p2〉〉−∞(x), δ = lcm(δ1, δ2)
〈〈p− (b ? r : 0)〉〉−∞(x) = (p′ − (b′ ? r : 0), δ) where
(p′, δ1) = 〈〈p〉〉−∞(x), (b′, δ2) = 〈〈b〉〉−∞(x), δ = lcm(δ1, δ2)
〈〈max(p1, p2)〉〉−∞(x) = (max(p′1, p′2), δ) where
(p′1, δ1) = 〈〈p1〉〉−∞(x), (p′2, δ2) = 〈〈p2〉〉−∞(x), δ = lcm(δ1, δ2)
〈〈min(p1, p2)〉〉−∞(x) = (min(p′1, p′2), δ) where
(p′1, δ1) = 〈〈p1〉〉−∞(x), (p′2, δ2) = 〈〈p2〉〉−∞(x), δ = lcm(δ1, δ2)
Fig. 9: Left Infinite Projection for Simple Permission Expressions
Proof. By straightforward induction over the definition of 〈〈b〉〉−∞(x) (the structure
of b is reduced in every recursive call, so this is well-founded).
Lemma 7. For a given state σ, if σ |= ∀y.b[y/x] ⇒ ∃z.z < y ∧ b[z/x] then
σ |= (∃x.b)⇔
∨
d∈[0,δ−1]
b′[d/x], where (b′, δ) = 〈〈b〉〉−∞(x).
Proof. The hypothesis expresses that b can be made true for arbitrarily small
values z. By Lemma 6, we know that for values e smaller than some m, evaluating
b[e/x] gives the same answer as evaluating b′[(e%δ)/x]. Therefore, one of the
disjuncts in the statement of this result must hold (since we enumerate all possible
values of (e%δ)).
B.3 Left-Infinite Projection of Permission Expressions
We deal first with the special case of there being arbitrarily small values of x
defining the pointwise maximum expression in question. We define a function
to reflect the value of the permission expression in question for these arbitrarily
small values. The idea behind the function is that for the supported grammar
of expressions, if one considers sufficiently small values of x, all evaluations of p
will yield the same value, modulo the divisibility constraints in p. Our function
returns a simplified permission expression (representing the value that p takes
for these sufficiently-small values of x), along with the lowest common multiple
of these divisibility constraints (defining the period of the repeating values of p
in this small-enough range):
Definition 9 (Left-Infinite Projection for Permission Expressions). The
left-infinite projection of p, written 〈〈p〉〉−∞(x) returns a pair (p′, δ) of permission
expression and integer value, and is defined in Fig. 9.
As an example, suppose we have the p permission expression (qa = a ∧ qi =
j ? rd : 0). We have 〈〈qa = a ∧ qi = j〉〉−∞(j) = (qa = a ∧ false, 1) (false since the
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expression qi = j is not true for arbitrarily small values of j, and 1 since
there are no divisibility constraints). Simplifying the resulting expression, we
obtain 〈〈p〉〉−∞(x) = (0, 1). This 0 result reflects the fact (common for expressions
generated by our permission analysis) that the value of the maximum expression
of interest is not defined by arbitrarily small values of j (as can be easily seen by
hand, the maximum value is defined by choosing j to be exactly qi.
The following lemma shows how p and its left-infinite projection are related,
for sufficiently small values of x (these are values for which the evaluation of all
(in/dis-)equalities have already stabilised).
Lemma 8. For all simple permission expressions p and environments σ, there
exists an integer constant m such that, for all expressions e:
σ |= e ≤ m⇒ (p[e/x] = p′[(e%δ)/x])
where (p′, δ) = 〈〈p〉〉−∞(x)
Proof. By straightforward induction over the definition of 〈〈p〉〉−∞(x) (the struc-
ture of p is reduced in every recursive call, so this is well-founded), using the
corresponding Lemma 6.
Lemma 9. For a given state σ, if σ |= ∀y.b[y/x] ⇒ ∃z.z < y ∧ b[z/x] then
σ |= (∃x.b)⇔
∨
d∈[0,δ−1]
b′[d/x], where (b′, δ) = 〈〈b〉〉−∞(x).
Proof. The hypothesis expresses that b can be made true for arbitrarily small
values z. By Lemma 6, we know that for values e smaller than some m, evaluating
b[e/x] gives the same answer as evaluating b′[(e%δ)/x]. Therefore, one of the
disjuncts in the statement of this result must hold (since we enumerate all possible
values of (e%δ)).
The following result states that, when arbitrarily small values of x define
max
x|b
p, these can be captured using our left-infinite projection, along with Cooper’s
analogous definition for boolean expressions:
Lemma 10. For any p, b, σ, if (p′, δ1) = 〈〈p〉〉−∞(x), (b′, δ2) = 〈〈b〉〉−∞(x), and
σ |= ∀y.∃z.z < y ∧ p[z/x] > 0 ∧ b[z/x] ∧ p[z/x] = max
x|b
p, then:
max
x|b
p = max
d∈[0,lcm(δ1,δ2)−1]
(b′[d/x] ? p′[d/x] : 0)
Proof. The (rather long) last hypothesis expresses that there are arbitrarily small
values of x defining the desired maximum value. By Lemma8, we know that
for values e smaller than some m, evaluating p[e/x] gives the same answer as
evaluating p′[(e%δ1)/x]. Similarly, by Lemma 6, we know that for e smaller than
some m′, evaluating b[e/x] gives the same answer as evaluating b′[(e%δ2)/x].
Therefore, for all e smaller than the minimum of m and m′, the only values
(b ? p : 0)[e/x] takes are included within the set {(b′[d/x] ? p′[d/x] : 0) | d ∈
lcm(δ1, δ2)− 1}. Since we are working under the hypothesis that arbitrarily small
values of x define the desired maximum value, it must also be one of the values
in this set. By taking the maximum of all of these, as in the statement of the
lemma, we are guaranteed to capture it.
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B.4 Boundary Expressions for Permission Expressions
We now turn to the results concerning our boundary expression selection for
permission expressions (Def. 1).
Lemma 11. For all simple permission expressions p, environments σ and integer
expressions n, if p contains no subtraction terms, and (T, δ) = 〈〈p〉〉small(x) then,
for all integer constants m > 0, either:
1. ∃(e, b) ∈ T, d ∈ [0,m·δ − 1]. σ |= b[n/x] ∧ n = e+ d, or:
2. σ |= p[(n−m·δ)/x] ≥ p[n/x]
Proof. By straightforward induction on p, using Lemma4 when our definition
makes use of the analogous notion of boundary expressions for booleans (Def. 7).
The proof uses as additional lemma that, since p contains no subtraction terms,
it (and all of its subexpressions) denote only non-negative values (in all environ-
ments), which is used in the inductive case for minimum expressions.
We now prove a slight generalisation of the above result, to account for
subtraction terms (in the limited positions that they are allowed; recall that they
cannot occur under addition operators, according to Def. 6).
Lemma 12. For all simple permission expressions p, environments σ and integer
expressions n, and (T, δ) = 〈〈p〉〉small(x) and σ |= p[n/x] ≥ 0 then, for all integer
constants m > 0, at least one of the following holds:
1. ∃(e, b) ∈ T, d ∈ [0,m·δ − 1]. σ |= b[n/x] ∧ n = e+ d, or:
2. σ |= p[(n−m·δ)/x] ≥ p[n/x], or:
3. σ |= p[n/x] = 0.
Proof. By straightforward induction on p, using Lemma4 and Lemma11 (and
considering the combinations of case-splits that these result in).
We are now finally in a position to prove Thm. 4, whose definition we recall
here:
Theorem 4 (Simple Maximum Expression Elimination). For any pair
(p, b), if |= p ≥ 0, then we have:
|= max
x|b
p = max
(
max
(e,b′′)∈T
d∈[0,δ−1]
(b′′ ∧ b[e+ d/x] ? p[e+ d/x] : 0)),
max
d∈[0,lcm(δ1,δ2)−1]
(b′[d/x] ? p′[d/x] : 0)
)
where (T, δ) = 〈〈(p, b)〉〉smallmax(x), (b′, δ1) = 〈〈b〉〉−∞(x) and (p′, δ2) = 〈〈p〉〉−∞(x).
Proof. We consider the values of the two equated terms in an arbitrary environ-
ment σ (on which some of the following case-splits may depend, due to other free
variables in the expressions).
We then consider the same top-level case-split as informs the design of our
algorithm: (1) there is a smallest value of x defining the pointwise maximum in
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question, or (2) the pointwise maximum’s value is defined by arbitrarily small
values of x. Note that in either case, it is then sufficient to show that the result
of our maximum elimination is at least as large as the pointwise maximum in
question; since every term in our maximum construction has either a value that p
takes for some value of x, or the value 0, it certainly cannot result in an answer
which is too large.
If σ |= max
x|b
p = 0, we are immediately done, since our resulting expression
has, by construction, a non-negative value in all states. Thus, we proceed with
the case that σ |= max
x|b
p > 0.
Case (2) also follows directly, since Lemma10 tells us that the pointwise
maximum’s value will be equal to max
d∈[0,lcm(δ1,δ2)−1]
(b′[d/x] ? p′[d/x] : 0), which
appears as argument to our overall binary max operator.
Therefore, we are left to consider case (1): there is some smallest value
of x (say, n) such that both σ |= b[n/x] and σ |= max
x|b
p = p[n/x]. Note that
δ = lcm(δ1, δ2) (our algorithms compute this value two different ways). Let
(Tp, δ2) = 〈〈p〉〉smallmax(x) and (Sb, δ1) = 〈〈b〉〉small(x) (following Fig. 5).
We apply Lemma 4 (choosing m to be δ/δ1, so that m·δ1 = δ), to obtain two
cases: either ∃e ∈ Sb, d ∈ [0, δ − 1].σ |= e+ d = n, or: (II) σ |= b[(n− δ)/x].
Similarly, from Lemma 12, we obtain the two cases that either: (I’) ∃(e, b′) ∈
Tp, d ∈ [0, δ − 1].σ |= b[e/x] ∧ e+ d = n or: (II’) σ |= p[(n− δ)/x] ≥ p[n/x].
If case (I’) holds, we are done, since Tp ⊆ T , and so we have captured the
defining value for the pointwise maximum in our iteration over the elements of T .
If cases (II) and (II’) both hold, then we contradict our assumption from overall
case (1), since the value n − δ is smaller than n, satisfies b and results in a
larger value for p. Therefore, we are left to consider the combination of cases (I)
and (II’). By case (I) we have a boundary condition e for b, but this boundary
condition gets an additional (large disjunction as a) filter condition, according to
Fig. 5; in order to conclude the case, we need to justify that this filter condition
is guaranteed to hold (and hence, the boundary condition still gets to contribute
to our definition of T ).
Consider now the set of values L = {n− a·δ | a > 0}. We identify three cases:
1. ∃l ∈ L.σ |= b[l/x] ∧ p[l/x] = p[n/x]: This again contradicts our assumption
on n.
2. ∀l ∈ L.σ |= ¬b[l/x] ∧ p[l/x] = p[n/x]: Then by Lemma8, there exists
d ∈ [0, δ − 1] such that σ |= 〈〈p〉〉−∞(x)[d/x] = p[n/x] ∧ ¬〈〈b〉〉−∞(x)[d/x], and
therefore the first large disjunct in the filter condition for e holds.
3. ∃l ∈ L.σ |= ¬b[l/x]∧p[l/x] = p[n/x]∧p[l−δ/x] < p[n/x]: Then, by Lemma 12,
∃(e′′, b′′) ∈ Tp, d′′ ∈ [0, δ − 1].σ |= b′′[l/x]∧ e′′+d′′ = l. Then the second large
disjunct in the filter condition for e holds.
In the latter two cases, we therefore have a boundary expression in T whose filter
condition holds, and which is guaranteed to define the pointwise maximum in
question.
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